By Axel Gelfert
Covering present literature and significant debates, A severe creation to Testimony discusses the epistemic prestige of testimony-based ideals, relates alterations to proper advancements in different components and provides a severe point of view on present and destiny examine tendencies. Devoting area to either the functions of social epistemology and the bigger conceptual problems with wisdom, Gelfert not just introduces the epistemology of testimony; he bargains an up to date creation to epistemology. built with a mixture of research questions, examples, and proposals for additional analyzing, scholars of up to date epistemology will locate this a competent advisor to learning testimony as a resource of knowledge.
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Extra info for A Critical Introduction to Testimony
2. Our epistemic predicament On the standard view in epistemology, knowledge is a species of justified true belief – even if it turns out to be exceedingly difficult to specify the conditions for when a justified true belief should count as knowledge. While this view has not been without its fair share of critics – recall Welbourne’s alternative proposal, discussed in the previous section – it continues to inform many issues in epistemology. Indeed, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that, in essence, most problems in epistemology concern the question of how we should regulate and revise our beliefs.
Inferential expansion, thus, is cognitively demanding and requires active effort. By contrast, in routine expansion, the agent has already decided, prior to inquiry, to accept the outcome of the chosen routine without further investigation. : 39). An interesting situation arises when the belief to be ‘imported’ into the agent’s corpus, contradicts other beliefs which the agent already holds. In such a case, after belief expansion, the agent could no longer consider all of his beliefs to be true.
Michael Welbourne, in a series of papers, has argued that underlying our mundane practices of asking and telling is an essential feature of knowledge, which sets it apart from individual belief. This feature is its essential commonability: the fact that it can be collectively shared. As Welbourne puts it: ‘Knowledge is not, as a belief necessarily is, the unique possession of an individual; rather it is a thing which may be available to anybody’ (1986: 6). If we were to think of the communication of knowledge merely in terms of the duplication of the speaker’s belief in the mind of the hearer, we would be missing an important difference between the two: If you and I both believe that p, then there are two beliefs, yours and mine.