By by Dines Chandra Sircar.
Read or Download A grammar of the Prakrit language : based mainly on Vararuchi's Prākṛitaprakāśa PDF
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Extra resources for A grammar of the Prakrit language : based mainly on Vararuchi's Prākṛitaprakāśa
To that effect, I ask whether he considered them necessarily inaccessible or only contingently so and examine the extent to which much later endeavors—namely, Freud’s approach to human subjectivity and Marx’s approach to society and history—might count as Attributes of this sort. Further on, I argue that Spinoza’s failure to distinguish the conceptual (the grammatical) from the purely logical forced him to run together two “parts” of each Attribute, ones that, on Wittgenstein’s way of viewing things, should be carefully kept distinct.
The philosophical message is that any theory whatsoever, postclassical physical theories included, will always be open to the abstract possibility in question. To secure the perspective of radical immanence for good, then, Wittgenstein had to establish it at the level where these abstract possibilities themselves reside. At the same time, the developments in logic (determined significantly by Wittgenstein’s own work) had rendered logic capable of treating precisely such abstract possibilities. , conceptually empty) possibilities that underlie10 all language (and all thought and all the world) and constitute logic itself.
Further on, I argue that Spinoza’s failure to distinguish the conceptual (the grammatical) from the purely logical forced him to run together two “parts” of each Attribute, ones that, on Wittgenstein’s way of viewing things, should be carefully kept distinct. These two parts are, on the one hand, the logical core of each Attribute, which ensures that it is—exactly like all the others—an objective perspective on Substance, and, on the other hand, the specificity of the Attribute, which can be laid out with concepts proper only to it.